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An LDe Debt Update
Over the last three years, the international debt
situation has seen several ups and downs. At
times, the difficulties less-developed countries
(LpCslfacedin servicingtheirforeign debts raised
fears overthestabilityofthe international banking
system, butthatsystem has survived. There is even
optimism in well-informed circles that, under
reasonable conditions and with further coopera-
tive efforts by all concerned, normal international
lending might be restored in three to five years.
According to this view, a few individual debtor
countries will continue to experience difficulty in
servicing their external debts, perhaps for several
years to come, but the overall situation has
improved sufficiently to warrant the conclusion
that remaining problems are manageable.
This Letter examines the basis for this optimism.
Drawing on recent developments, especially
those over the past year, it highlights lessons we
have learned and whichshould enable us toassess
the prospects for solving the LDC-debt problem.
Recent developments
Argentina and Mexico provide two interesting
examples of how the LDC debt problem was
managed in 1984. The first was involved in
long negotiations that culminated in a debt-
rescheduling agreement still beset by doubts
that the agreement could be implemented.
Mexico's situation has been widely regarded as
a model of successful international cooperation
and sound national economic adjustment for
enhancing a debtor nation's international credit-
worthiness. Together, the two provide revealing
tests of the international mechanism put in
place for dealing with the LDC debt problem.
Like other LDC debtor nations, Argentina was
hit hard by the protracted and severe world
recession of 1980~82, the unprecedentedly high
real interest rates then and subsequently, and
the precipitous decline in international lending
that occurred after 1982. On top of all this, the
nation suffered from the ill-fated Falklands War
and its aftermath, and from being a society
deeply divided between powerful labor unions
and a discredited military junta. By the time a
newly elected president took office in January
1984, the country was running an inflation rate
of over 400 percent a year and a government
budget deficit amounting to 18 percent of the
gross domestic product. With a $40 billion
external debt, it started 1984 already $2.5
billion in arrears on debt service, with more
external debts falling due during that year.
Shortly after taking office, the new government
began negotiations with the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMFl for a $1.4 billion loan to help
refinance the nation's external debts. Although
small relative to the total needed, the IMF
credit was the key for gaining access to larger
bank loans. Under the existing international
strategy, banks would agree to debt resched-
uling and extension of new credits to a debtor
nation only after the IMF has approved the
nation's economic adjustment program designed
to put its house in order. In Argentina's case,
the IMF demanded that the nation cut its budget
deficit and resist inflationary wage increases,
among other measures, to bring down its triple-
digit inflation rate.
Negotiations were difficult. Deadlines for inter-
est payment were met only by emergency short-
term credits extended by foreign governments.
Eventually, in September, Argentina reached 'an
agreement with the IMF on an adjustment pro-
gram. This was followed by an agreement in
December with a committee representing all
foreign creditor banks for rescheduling $10 bil-
lion in existing debts and extending $4 billion
in new loans. Since then, inflation in Argentina
has risen to 800 percent a year, raising ques-
tions as to the extent to which that country
will be able to carry out the terms of its IMF
agreement.
In contrast, the Mexican debt rescheduing in
September 1984 has been hailed as exemplary
and precedent-setting. Reportedly, the agree-
ment was reached after only three weeks of
intense discussion between Mexico and its
foreign-bank committee. It rescheduled $49
billion in loans falling due in 1985-90 for repay-
ment over fourteen years beginning with small
payments in 1986. The negotiated interest rateFRBSF
was a very favorable 1.125 percent over the
London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (L1BOR). In
part, these favorable terms reflected international
recognition of Mexico's success in enhancing its
external debt-servicing capability. By adjusting
its government policies, Mexico was able to
change its current account balance from a $12.5
billion deficit in 1981 to a $5.5 billion surplus in
1983 and an estimated $4 billion surplus in 1984.
Besides Mexico and Argentina, Venezuela also
reached agreement in September with interna-
tional banks to reschedule $21 billion of its
maturing debts for repayment over twelve years.
The Philippinesreceived acriticallMFapproval in
Decemberofa $615 million loan, paving the way
for negotiations for rescheduling $5 billion of its
debtsto international banks. In Februarythis year,
Brazil secured atentative agreement with its bank
committee to restructure its external debts other-
wise due in 1985-91 for repayment over sixteen
years. This series of successful multi-year debt
reschedulings on relatively favorable terms pre-
sents asharpcontrasttotheoftentimes acrimonious
annual debt negotiations in the preceding two
years, and have helped considerably to calm the
international financial scene.
Effective strategy?
Critics are quick to charge that all these debt
reschedulings are no more than a "band aid"
remedy to a basically unresolved LDC debt
problem. They claim that rescheduling merely
postpones the day of settlement by rolling over
uncollectible debts. Banks, in this view, are
caught in the game because playing along is
the only way to forestall outright defaults that
would compel them to write off the loans as
bad debts against their current income. The
governments of the lender nations and the IMF
also are caught up in this game because they
supposedly have to "bailout" the banks to
prevent a collapse of the international banking
system.
Appealing in its simplicity, this view is never-
theless unsound because it ignores the very
large adjustments that the debtor nations have
already made to reduce their external payments
deficits in the short span of three years. Indeed,
the LDC debtor nations have made large and
difficult adjustments in the face of declining
export receipts, rising interest burdens, and
dwindling capital inflow.
Mexico is not the only debtor country that has
made substantial improvements in its balance
of payments. The combined current account
deficit of the seven largest Latin American
countries - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela - fell from $35
billion in 1981 to $5 billion in 1983. The
improvement was achieved largely through
drastic import cutbacks,averaging nearly 50
percent for the group as a whole and as much
as 68 percent for Mexico.
The deep cuts in imports were not achieved
without cost to the debtor nations. The bulk of
the cuts was made in imports of capital equip-
ment and immediate goods needed for slJstain-
ing current production. For the seven Latin
American nations as a whole, the size of cuts
was about 50 percent for each of these two
categories between 1981 and 1983. The reduc-
tions were especially remarkable given the
average annual growth rates in these imports of
56 percent and 114 percent between 1978 and
1981, respectively. While imports of consumer
goods were also halved, the absolute magni-
tude of reduction was small ($4 billion) relative
to the reductions in the other two categories
($12 billion each) because consumer goods
imports were not large to begin with. The cut-
backs in producer goods imports were associ-
ated with a decline of 4 percent in real output
from 1981 to 1983 for the group as a whole.
Against a backdrop of continued population
growth (averaging 2.5 percent a year), these
adjustments translated into a decline in per
capita income of about 10 percent between
1981 and 1983 -the sharpest since the 1930s.
Conditions for the debtor nations, however,
improved considerably in 1984. The vigorous
economic growth of the United States and the
high value of the U.S. dollar have provided a
rapidly expanding market for their exports. Total
U.S. imports rose by 30 percent in 1984, with
those from Asia rising by 45 percent, from Latin
America by 17 percent, and from all developing
countries combined by 23 percent. Led by
export expansion, the total output of developing
countries increased by 3.5 percent, reversing
the declines for the preceding three years. For
the seven largest Latin American countries, total
exports rose by 12 percent in 1984, compared
to an 8 percent decline from 1981 to 1983.
Their combined current account deficit fell fur-ther to an estimated $2 billion from $5 billion
in 1983, while their total real output achieved a
2.5 percent rate of growth, compared to a 2.5
percent decline in 1983.
Conclusions and prospects
The LOC-debt situation has indeed improved
significantlyoverthe past three years, thanks to a
combination offactors: international debt re-
scheduling plus new credits to help the debtor
nations avoid a liquidity crunch; the strenuous
efforts bythe debtor nations themselves to reduce
their payments deficits; and, finally, the vigorous
economic growth in the United States and the
strong U.S. dollar. The high value ofthe dollar,
however, cuts both ways. While it has helped the
debtor nations to expand their exports to the U.S.
market, ithas also meantan increase in the burden
of dollar-denominated debts. Moreover, the con-
tinued high real interest rates, i.e., interest rates
adjusted for inflation, have not helped ease the
debt burden. Nevertheless, despite these diffi-
culties, significant strides have been made in
mitigating the severity ofthe LDC debt problem.
Particularly noteworthy in the developments last
yearwasthe rise ofmuIti-yeardebtreschedulings.
In the depth ofthe debt crisis in 1982 and 1983,
thegeneral viewwas torescheduIe debtsoneyear
at a time as the debts fell due in order to keep up
the pressure on debtor countries to adopt appro-
priate economic adjustment programs. Now that
adjustment programs have been put into place
and shown success in a number ofcases, there is
room for taking a longer term perspective and
pursuing long-run economic growth objectives.
Given continued international monitoring ofthe
progress ofeconomic adjustment programs, this
approach provides a better framework for solving
the LOC-debt problem.
The progress made in resolving the LDC debt
problem does notmean thatthe road ahead is all
clear. On the contrary, even nowthere are grave
concernsoverArgentina'sfailureto Iiveuptothe
terms of its agreement with the IMF to reduc;e
domestic inflation, and over the snag in Brazil's
renegotiation of the terms of its IMF program
required for the completion of its debt resched-
uling package with international bankers. Dis-
tressing and even potentially serious as these
developments may be, they provide little reason
for pessimism. In recent years, both LDC debtor
and creditor nations have gained sufficient
experience with and understanding ofthe debt
rescheduling process that one can be cautiously
optimistic that, with patience and cooperation
from all parties, current problems wiII be solved.
Hang-Sheng Cheng
Opinionsexpressed in this newsletterdo not necessarily reflect theviews ofthemanagementofthe Federal Reserve Bank ofSan
Francisco, orofthe Board ofGovernorsofthe Federal Reserve System.
Editorialcommentsmaybeaddressedtotheeditor(GregoryTong) ortotheauthor....FreecopiesofFederal Reserve publications
can beobtainedfrom the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco
94120. Phone(415) 974-2246.uo~6U!4S0m 4o~n U060JO OpOA0U





BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)











Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 189,192 - 239 12,673 7.2
Loans and Leases1 6 171,641 - 286 14,825 9.4
Commercial and Industrial 52,877 - 262 5,376 11.3
Real estate 62,526 72 2,666 4.4
Loans to Individuals 32,133 147 5,922 21.7
Leases 5,322 2 323 6.4
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,648 45 - 1,566 - 12.8
OtherSecurities2 6,903 2 - 582 - 7.7
Total Deposits 193,421 412 8,271 4.5
Demand Deposits 44,208 330 1,311 3.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 29,528 298 258 0.9
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,091 - 109 1,034 8.5
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,121 190 5,929 4.5
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 43,885 24 3,326 8.2
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 39,064 104 954 2.5
Other Liabilities for Borrowed Money5 19,304 952 369 1.9
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (- )
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U. S. government and d~pository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts withtelephonetransfers
5 Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange